

ASA Storage Room Security Town Hall Meeting, 16 February 2008

Goals

discuss security measures, 3 or 4 options that we have put together and get a sense of what the group thinks.

Rooms

437 is already a storage room, 441 will be the new one.

Options

Option 1: stay as is. Code punch in one room, or code and card in other.

Options 2: Walker does metal keys.

Option 3: proximity reader

Option 4: Cameras

As Is (Codes)

With the codes a president or treasurer requests the code from CAC and they can pass to anyone in the group. They're not supposed to pass over email, works for non-MIT students. No control on access. No record of who goes into the rooms.

Metal Key Metal key option, you can pass the key around. Two problems, multiple people can gain access. Keys disappear. Added level of responsibility. No record kept.

Prox Reader

Prox reader pros- added security, need an MIT id. You can't just pass access around. Need to request through CAC to get it changed around. System knows if people lose or get a new card. It records who goes in and when, not a public record. Only the MIT police know if an incident is reported. People had concerns. It's 3000-4000 dollars a door. Non MIT members cannot access the room by default. But alums and staff members can get permissions on their cards. Groups can request an affiliate card. At the moment, student groups can't access who has access online. It is still planned for the future, and CAC still has to update themselves.

Cameras

Pro- can watch what is going on.

Con- more expensive, by the cameras, pay someone to store, record the data. Privacy issues, this is student group space and supposed to be an open environment. Not suggested by CAC but still an option.

Q & A

Student: surprised to learn that the codes doesn't track which codes was entered when people enter the office. Can we get the codes to be tracked on the multiple group/multiple code system? Then we can get the benefits of the code.

Kerri: The system on the door currently isn't made to do that. The people that make the prox readers do have a keypad entry. But she's only seen it used as an alarm point.

Even if you could do that it would still be the high cost of the prox card readers. Can be looked into. Other problems with the key pad. Some numbers wear out quicker than others and causes the pad to need to be replaced. How would you handle the replacement charges for that case?

S: Possibility of the prox card reader, certain number of cards assigned to each group, but not attached to a name. So that the group knows what person that is, but CAC doesn't really have the list. It would help with the change in the leadership.

James: it's almost like having a prox card that acts as a key.

S: but it keeps a record.

J: not sure if you can have a carte blanche card. Do they have to have a name tied to it?

We can look into it. How many does a group get?

S: Clarify the prox card is 3000-4000 dollars? James misspoke.

Prox card maintenance is?

K: wear and tear, the cards are tied to the building power. The individual door readers are not tied to the systems. Sometimes the batteries go dead. Something that people periodically check.

S: Is it a common case among the groups that want to use, that there are non MIT members? They have people who aren't MIT but they find ways to get affiliate cards.

Other S: Their group would have to do with a large reorganization of power to get that to be true.

J: part of the reason that we're having this discussion is that there have been multiple thefts. They they request that all the codes be changed immediately. We haven't caught person(s) responsible. Is a good first step is to limit to only MIT? Or prox card readers? We'd like to help with the theft issue. We can't go and buy a ridiculously strong lockers—we don't have the money.

Student from group with a new locker: he thinks that cameras have the best chance of stopping theft. Is there some recording cameras recording from outside?

J: No, unless a group put it there

S: privacy issues? What else are people doing in there other than getting things?

J: it's a tradition

S: but it's a tradition that's getting things stolen.

J: one idea is that the two rings in the 4th floor would get prox card readers.

OS: what about the MIT students?

J: How big of an issue is the non MIT student?

S: Just about the two storage rooms?

J: at least 20-30 groups in the rooms

S: If you're not meeting in those rooms, does that effect the fact that non MIT students can't get in.

OS: yes, some non MIT people need the access, we know how often they change.

J: the current turn around is two weeks, but the new system would be instantaneous.

OS: There are issues with how we use the storage space. The key and code work a lot better for how the group is using the space.

J: in Walker, we lose a lot of keys. And then we have to change the locks, who pays for that? All the groups in the room?

S: Difference between the needs of the groups between the two storage rooms?

J: we could talk about splitting the two rooms, if people are interested. SAO at the moment still have the code system. Prox reader on the new room → MIT only. Old room is the old system?

S: Cost of the affiliate card system to the group themselves? 5-10 people it's like the MIT id, you don't get charged for it. But there are replacement costs.

J: CAC/ASA is willing to work with the groups, If you need a stamp that says that a group is approved for the affiliate card.

S: People will willingly pass the cards around. Affiliate cards don't have the same this is my ID I need it feeling and won't need it back at the end of the day and could end up as a blank card. People would think of this and not think of the security measures.

OS: At least the card is still tied to your group.

J: We can have the permissions expire.

S: if it's ok with the CAC to be using cards in that manner, then it's like the blank card system.

J: we don't want to make the rules for each group.

If we have so many cards per group. The

S: what is more important, risk of theft or access to more people. This group doesn't store things of value. If they steal a soda, oh well. He wants to have access. What is the bigger issue?

S: If it was free, then the cameras would be fine.

J: it probably won't be.

S: how do the groups feel about the privacy issues?

OS: there could be people who would object.

J: not a lot of groups are going for makeout sessions.

Phil Walsh is against cameras. For the reason that it starts to create the president of the big brother thing. There were cameras in stata and people were upset about it. But if you vote that's fine. But in two years what will people think? We don't have money in our budget.

S: in terms of the cameras. He doesn't have issues, but can see how people would. But it seems like the biggest ongoing cost and aren't an access solution. He thinks that metal key is among the worst solutions for some place with multiple groups. Has an office in W11 that's shared and have lost lots of keys (10 of 50 remaining after 10 years or so). Thinks they're probably gone, lost.

J: metal key was the lower end of things.

OS: Problem is inner group control as opposed to larger big brother things. Some groups have muttering about cameras in their lockers. But that's their own issue. Same with a

prox reader. The group maintains the record. So you know what group is in there, and then you approach the group.

J: reiterates, only the MIT CPs would be the ones contacting. But if they open the file and find that the prox readers are being used in the carte blanche way, groups could object if it comes out this way. We have yet to have a group with a reader that has a theft.

S: Putting up a security camera where there have been thefts, not always effective, if all you want to know is who is in there at some time—then the prox reader is telling you the same information with some kind of privacy.

J: would like us to look up and see if there is an option of the blank card. Can the group get three affiliate cards that are passed around. Given that we look into that, is it that people want to go the prox route given that we can get it to non MIT people? And if we can't get it to non MIT people then that kills the idea?

S: if we set the prox readers aside for a second, the metal key solution is better than the codes. The codes can reproduce themselves at a fast rate. Keys get lost, but you can't have everyone have it. Prefers metal key.

S: how easily is it changed? What if the key changed every year? Or the code changed every year? It seems like they're never changed

J: The problem is that the code is changed every year.

J: we've changed them approximately everytime there is a theft. I know they have been changed. What if the codes are changed? Then the president and/or the treasurer has to go to CAC in person to get it and aren't supposed to travel over email.

S: doesn't seem like an inherent limitation to the codes.

J: just a currently limitation.

OS: if they have keys and change the lock, then they still have to go in person to get the keys

S: yes and the keys are more costly to change.

J: comment on the actual code device. They are going out of style, not really made anymore. It's becoming the point where it's not really able to do it.

K: people are going to the new technology and it's in limited manufacture. Some doors are codes, cards, or combination of both. These units are 600-1000 dollars to replace, we find that more and more are starting to go. In six months, this conversation might be void because it could cost 1000 to replace or we might not be able to find them. She will take the blank affiliate cards issue and talk to the director and security. What limits do we need to have in order to do it. Would we have to list the treasurer and the president as the one listed on the card. What do we have to do for an electronic keypad.

S: what is the overhead in prox card.

K: similar to codes, but easier to update. We get a list and pass to security. The codes are done internally. Working on a database that can be updated immediately. Currently it's up to a weeks lag time for the changes.

S: what happens when board changes over?

K: we can lock down and change

S: what if we can't get into the room in those days.

J: but won't the old ones stay until the update.

K: yes, unless we add a termination period for all groups updating.

J: We're going to investigate, want to do what's best for as many people as possible.
Another town hall or an online vote?

S: Online.

OS: there aren't that many people here.

OOS: restart the discussion all over again if you open back up to everyone online?

J: we can't lock out all the groups moving into storage, we have to have a decision now.

J: Announcements—lockers have arrived, shelves have arrived. We will try to build them next weekend. New groups in locker rooms, help if appreciated so we don't have to pay people! 25-26 feb secure the lockers to the ground. Moving people a few days after that. Moves are into phases that allow for cleaning. Goal is to be all done by mid-March.